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What is corporate governance? This concept has been interpreted in various ways. In the USA 
the corporate governance is to subordinate a company’s managers to the shareholders’ benefit. In 
contrast, the European type of  corporate governance attaches importance to the social value of  a 
company from the standpoint of  stakeholders in the wide sense. 
In this paper I will examine desirable direction of  the Japanese type of  corporate governance. 
For that purpose, firstly, specific features and problems of  the Japanese style management will be 
examined. Secondly, introducing opinions of  two representative researchers in Japan, problems of  
the American type of  corporate governance will be examined. 
 




Not so long ago, perhaps in mid 1980s, ‘corporate governance’ began to be 
discussed. What is corporate governance? This concept has been interpreted in 
various ways. In the USA a manager’s work in a joint-stock company is to maximize 
shareholders’ economic benefit measured by the shareholders’ value. Consequently, 
the corporate governance is to subordinate a company’s managers to the 
shareholders’ benefit. In this way, the American type of corporate governance aims 
to maximize the shareholders’ benefit from the standpoint of shareholders who are 
stakeholders in the narrow sense (Kakurai, 2005, p.88). Many Japanese people feel 
that something is wrong with the way of thinking that shareholders should be the 
almighty in a joint-stock company. 
In contrast, the European type of corporate governance attaches importance to 
the social value of a company from the standpoint of stakeholders in the wide sense. 
Here the stakeholders include not only shareholders of the company but also 
creditors, employees and consumers (Ibid., pp.93-94). However, if many stakeholders 
inside and outside a company are included in the persons concerned of its corporate 
governance, it seems to be too wide to clarify the problem.  
Indeed, without capital any companies cannot be established. But it is sure that 
without daily labors and efforts of workers who work at the companies they will 
never operate and develop. How should we understand the problem? In this paper
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will examine desirable direction of the Japanese type of corporate governance. For 
that purpose, firstly, specific features and problems of the Japanese style 
management will be examined. Secondly, introducing opinions of two representative 
researchers in Japan, problems of the American type of corporate governance will be 
examined. Finally, conclusion will be drawn. 
 
II. Japanese Style Management 
 
Positive evaluation of Japanese style management has been prevalent in the 
world in the 1980s and early 1990s, reflecting high economic growth in Japan. At that 
time many people say as follows: In US enterprises shareholders’ voice is so strong 
that share prices and distribution of dividend have been given priority in enterprises’ 
management. Enterprises performance measured in every quarter has been attached 
importance. Therefore, the top management apt to manage their enterprises in short-
run perspective. In contrast, in the case of Japanese enterprises the top management 
manage their enterprises in long-run perspective. They tend to distribute a low 
dividend, but instead they tend to increase investment, giving priority to growth. 
Such a behavior is consistent with their shareholders’ interest. 
Japanese style management consists of three pillars: Seniority system; Life-long 
employment; and Company-wide trade union. These pillars have contributed to 
loyalty of employees to their companies. However, this can be applied only to big 
companies.  
    According to Iwai (2003), characteristics of Japanese companies can be 
summarized as follows: 
(1)  Compared with Europe and the USA, shareholder in most of Japanese 
companies have weaker voice and they can hardly put a word in companies’ 
management;  
(2)  In most of Japanese companies the top management (executives) has been 
chosen among employees through the competition for promotion within a company 
organization. They are running their company with expansion of company itself 
being as their target rather than the profit rate; 
(3)  Employees, not all but the core, of Japanese companies have been protected 
by Life-long employment system, seniority wage system and company-wide trade 
union, and therefore, they have a strong sense of belonging to their companies; 
(4)  In places of work in production, distribution and development of products 
in Japanese companies they attach importance to the informal relationship among 
employees who share information; 
(5)  Many Japanese companies have organized themselves into several groups, 
and they have cross share-holding and maintain horizontal ‘keiretsu’ relationship for 
a long-term; 
(6)  Many Japanese companies have maintained vertical ‘keiretsu’ relationship for 
a long-term with themselves on the top and with sub contractors and sub-sub 
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(7)  Many Japanese companies are financing their funds from the main banks 
which they have been maintaining a long-term financial relationship (Iwai, 2003). 
Japan has experienced the so-called a bubble economy due to high growth rate 
with speculation in real estates after the Plaza Accord in 1985. The bubble has burst 
in 1991. As a result the banking sector had a huge amount of bad loans. The solution 
of this problem has prolonged, and with this the Japanese economy stagnated in the 
1990s, which was called a lost decade. Hence appeared negative evaluation of 
Japanese style management at home and abroad. In Japan there are researchers who 
have pointed out problems of Japanese enterprises since a long time ago. Among 
them Hiroshi Okumura, the author of a famous book Corporate Capitalism: ‘Companies-
centered System’, criticizes defects of Japanese enterprises system. In his opinion, as for 
the relationship between a company and its employees, ‘Japanese style management’ 
has been in fact a ‘company-centered’ system. The relationship between a company 
and its shareholders has been also in fact a ‘company-centered’ system. Based on 
such a ‘company-centered’ system, managers represent the company, and they never 
represent its shareholders nor its employees. It is managers who represent ‘the 
company itself’ and as persons represent the company (Okumura, 1984, p.34). 
 According to him, it is the first half of the 1950s that concentration of shares 
in hands of corporations showed a noticeable increase for the first time. At that time 
the restriction on possession of shares by financial institutions and business 
corporations was eased owing to a revision of the anti-monopoly law, and with this 
as a trigger, concentration of shares in hands of corporations occurred. At this stage 
the reorganization of Zaibatsu to enterprise groups proceeded on the one hand, and 
the grouping of enterprises (= to organize a keiretsu) by big companies proceeded 
on the other hand. The concentration of shares at the second stage occurred from 
the second half of the 1960s through the 1970s. In response to the liberalization of 
capitals, ‘organization of stable shareholders’ was pursued as its countermeasure. As 
a result, cross-share holding (‘mochiai’) by corporations has proceeded, and the 
percentage of individual shareholders in the total shares has become very small 
(pp.53-61). Managers became able to manage their enterprises without minding 
shareholders’ interest. A dividend has been usually very small and it has been often 
even lower than interest rate (Ibid., p.68).  
  Who decides managers? According to the Commercial Code, it is the 
shareholders’ general meeting that elects directors and internal auditors. A 
representative director (= ‘Shacho’) is to be elected among directors. In most cases, 
however, shareholders’ general meeting is held with cartes blanches of corporate 
shareholders, and candidates of directors and internal auditors proposed by the 
company are usually approved as they are (Ibid., p.163). Consequently, in Japanese 
big companies, as a matter of fact, the president (representative director) decides 
directors, and when he retires he nominates his successor. Internal auditor is a 
position for a person who is unable to become a director and the second highest 
position that he can attain within the company. Therefore, it is impossible to expect 




 There have been many serious scandals. Here I will introduce two typical cases 
which occurred in recent years: 
-  Case of Kanebo. A long time ago the company was a famous textile 
company and later became a diversified company with a cosmetic department and 
some other departments. Although the company fell into a situation in which its debt 
exceeded its capital since several years ago, the top management continued to 
announce falsified profit and distribute dividend every year by window-dressing. At 
last three years ago the real situation was brought to light, and the company went 
bankrupt. Chuo Aoyama, one of the four major audit corporations in Japan, was 
cooperating with Kanebo’s window-dressing, and this audit corporation was severely 
criticized and was obliged to be dissolved later.  
-  Case of Mitsubishi Automobile Co. Since a long time ago the company has 
avoided the recall of cars when troubles occurred with cars and dealt with troubles 
separately. Therefore, the company has been often criticized for its corporate culture 
giving profit priority over safety. At last in 2002 a serious accident occurred where a 
tire, which was dislocated from a truck’s axle due to a badly adjusted hub, hit a 
mother and her child walking along a sidewalk and the mother died instantly. This 
affair became an object of public concern. The top management of Mitsubishi 
Fusoh, which used to be the Truck branch of Mitsubishi Automobile Co. and 
became independent a few years ago, was forced to resign. 
 It is certain that Japanese enterprises are now urged to change themselves. In 
order to correct such a situation revisions of laws have been repeated in recent years. 
For example, the Commercial Code has been undergone minor revisions for more 
than 10 times during past 5 years. The whole Commercial Law and the Corporate 
Law were changed in 2005. The revised Commercial Code, which came into effect in 
2003, allows major companies to adopt the form ‘companies with committee system’. 
I would like to add that here a major company in the Commercial Code denotes a 
company capitalized at 500 million yen or a company with its total debts of more 
than 20 billion yen (Kakurai, 2005, p.98). In this type of company the role of board 
of directors has changed from management into supervision. Executive officers are 
no longer members of the board of directors. Instead, many outside directors, who 
should reflect shareholders’ interest, are introduced to the board. The board of 
directors has three committees; Nomination Committee; Compensation Committee; 
and Auditing Committee. The board of directors choose CEO (Chief Executive 
Officer) (Yamada, 2004, p.110).  
In the case of SONY outside directors hold the majority in its board of 
directors. Major companies such as Hitachi, Ltd., and Toshiba transformed 
themselves into ‘companies with committee system’. As of 2005, the number of 
‘companies with committee’ system exceeded 100 (Kakurai, 2005, p.99) 
Recently in Japan a new social phenomenon has emerged which reminds us an 
American way of business. A typical case is that of Mr. Hirofumi Horie. He was an 
owner of an IT related company (Live Door) and other companies. He left the 
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opinion: “In this world there is nothing which cannot be bought with money” 
repelled older generations. Younger generation rather welcomed him. Two years ago 
young as he was (32 years old at that time), he tried to acquire a TV company. He run 
the general election in September 2005. He was defeated but was warmly received by 
younger generations. He became a hero of the time. In January 2006 year, however, 
he was arrested for violation of the Law on Securities Exchange, and was brought to 
trial. In March 2007 he was sentenced to two and a half years’ penal servitude. 
Cases of adversary takeover of enterprises have been very rare in Japan. In 
recent years, however, the situation has changed. A noteworthy case is Bulldog Sauce 
Company (BSC), a Japanese food company, vs. Steel Partners (SP) an American 
investment fund. It became known in 2002 that SP owned shares of the BSC, but 
there has been almost no contact from the former. Suddenly in May 2007 SP jumped 
into the largest shareholder with 10.52% of the total shares and offered take-over bid 
(TOB) with the aim to obtain all the shares. In order to counter this move, BSC 
adopted a poison pill, to put it concretely, the company planned to decrease the 
percentage of the shares held by SP through the distribution of reservation right for 
new shares free of charge. SP applied for a provisional injunction against the 
resolution of BSC’s shareholders’ meeting. This case went up to the Supreme Court. 
A petty bench of the Supreme Court judged that the distribution by BSC of 
reservation right for new shares free of charge does not contravene the purpose of 
the principle shareholders’ equality, and rejected SP’s application. BSC won the case, 
but it was obliged to spend a huge amount of money for trial-related expenditures 
and the payment to SP.   
This case tells us that in Japan many people have feeling of wrongness in 
investment funds from foreign countries which loudly demand Japanese companies 
to increase dividend, giving shareholders’ short-term benefit priority over the 
companies’ long-term benefit. Mr. Warren Lichtenstein, President of SP, said that he 
is not interested in a taste of the sauce, but he requested a change in the top 
management of the company. And he said, “I want to enlighten managers of 
Japanese companies and Japanese investors”. Such an arrogant speech offended 
many people in Japan. 
    Will Japanese enterprises be approaching toward the type of American 
enterprises hereafter? In my opinion, that is not likely to occur. Firstly because in 
Japanese society the tradition of “productivism” remains as Ronald Dore (2001) 
points out, and therefore many people are reluctant to play money games. Secondly 
because American type of corporate governance has serious defects. Below I will 
introduce arguments of two distinguished researchers in Japan: Hiroyuki Itami, 
Professor at the Hitotsubashi University, a specialist on Business Administration, and 
Katsuhito Iwai, Professor at the University of Tokyo, a specialist on Theoretical 
Economics. Professor Itami lays emphasis on differences in culture and tradition. 
Professor Iwai finds out a theoretical error in the American type of corporate 
governance. 




III. Professor Itami’s argument 
 
Itami defines corporate governance as follows: Exercise of influence on the 
management by ‘people possessing citizenship’ in an enterprise in order for the 
enterprise to continue showing its desirable performance (Itami, 2000, p.17). 
According to him, “Corporate governance is different from the management of an 
enterprise. The management of an enterprise is done by the managerial strata 
including the top management and it means the controlling action of business 
activities. The people possessing citizenship in an enterprise entrusts the controlling 
action to the managerial strata. … Check on managerial strata, managers in 
particular, is corporate governance” (Ibid., p.18). 
    The problem is how to comprehend ‘people possessing citizenship’ in an 
enterprise. The current Corporate Law prescribes that sovereign in an enterprise is its 
shareholders. However, Itami stresses that the Corporate Law is not a law which 
explicitly prescribes the relationship of rights and duties between people working in a 
company and its shareholders. He says, the Corporate Law is a law which prescribes 
the relationship of rights and duties between providers of stock capital and debtors 
within (and only within) the people who provided funds. He adds, an argument that 
Japan has a legal system of shareholders’ sovereignty and, therefore, employees’ 
sovereignty is against the law on the ground of the Corporate Law does not hold 
good (Ibid.,pp.84-85). 
    According to Itami, in Japan a generally accepted notion among people 
working in enterprises, especially big enterprises is that a company belongs to the 
people who work there (p.59). Corporate governance of Japanese enterprises is 
shareholders’ sovereignty in “tatemae” (a stated principle), but it is employees’ 
sovereignty in “hon’ne” (reality) (pp.49-50). Here employees’ sovereignty of Japanese 
enterprises means that employees’ sovereignty has primacy with shareholders’ 
sovereignty being secondary (p.59). However, it is noteworthy that in Japan usually 
managers have been chosen among ordinary employees who have competed for 
promotion within a company. Therefore, Itami includes also managers in a group of 
employees in this case. Namely, he uses a category of employee in a wider sense. In 
addition, he classifies the employees into several groups. Not all employees are 
equally substantial ‘sovereign’. There is a group of employees who commit 
themselves to the company for a long time and can be called a core member. People 
who belong to this group are substantially sovereign. Part-time workers and workers 
who do not intend to work in a company for a long time are excluded (Ibid., p.60). 
  Itami explains enterprises with employees’ sovereignty by his unique concept 
‘Jinponshugi’ (Human capitalism). One of his main works is Jinponshugi Kigyo [Human 
Capitalist Enterprises], published in 1987. ‘Jinponshugi’ is a word coined by Itami. He 
extracted it as “a principle that has existed behind the customary practice of 
management which most of the postwar Japanese enterprises have half tacitly done 
(Itami, 2000, p.70). 
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the following way: Institution (System) = Environment × Principle (Itami, 1987, 
p.20) . Later readers will be able to understand more concretely. 
  According to him, the enterprise system has the following three elements: (1) 
Concept of enterprise: to whom an enterprise belongs?; (2) Concept of sharing. This 
is his unique idea. Readers might confuse it with companies’ share (stocks), but it is 
quite different from that. The concept of sharing relates to who share what and get 
share of what?; and (3) Concept of market: how are enterprises connected with one 
another? (Ibid., p.31). He compares Human-capitalism and Capitalism (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Human-capitalism vs. Capitalism 
 Human-capitalism  Capitalism 
1. Concept of enterprise  Sovereignty in employees  Sovereignty in 
shareholders 
2. Concept of sharing  Dispersed sharing  Unified sharing 
3. Concept of market  Organized markets  Free markets 
Source: Ibid., p.37. 
 
According to him, behind the difference between Capitalism and Human-
capitalism there are different views on enterprises and people. There are three views 
of enterprises. Activities of enterprises are classified into the following three types: 
1) Collective of activities of material transformation; 2) Collective of information 
processing and learning; and 3) Collective of psychological reaction of enterprises’ 
member. In capitalist enterprise system there is stratification of three views of 
enterprises. At the bottom there is a view of materials. People are grasped as things. 
In order to make the things function a view of information becomes necessary. Then 
psychological aspect of human beings should be considered as an element which 
affects the information activity. In contrast, in human-capitalist enterprise system the 
three views of enterprises exist on equal footings or as a total behind the system. 
There is no stratification of the three views, or weak stratification if any. An 
enterprise is grasped as a collective of human beings. Human beings as physical 
substance, human beings as informational substance and human beings as 
psychological substance are all explicitly taken into consideration (Ibid., p.51) 
Why was it born in Japan? Was it due to its culture or the epoch? According to 
Itami, prewar society of Japanese enterprises was much more capitalistic than now. 
Itami presents the following hypothesis: If we distinguish a principle from an 
institution in our consideration, the principle of human-capitalism is not bound by 
the Japanese culture, but it is most likely that the institution as receptacle, which has 
supported the principle during the post-war period, has been affected by the 
Japanese culture (Ibid., p.60). 
 
Table 2 Differences in Competition between Human-capitalism and 
Capitalism 




Competition in the long run  Competition in the short run 
Competition with visible face  Competition with anonymity 
Multi-dimensional competition  Mono-dimensional competition 
Competition among groups  Competition among individuals 
Source: Ibid., pp.53-54. 
 
Itami explains the biggest reason why has such common principle emerged. He 
lays an emphasis on the circumstances in which the postwar Japan was placed. The 
situation such as disorder, critical situation and burst of people’s energies for 
democracy gave rise to a quite democratic and new enterprise system like the human-
capitalist enterprises system (Ibid., p.61). He describes the situation in Japan 
immediately after the war: Quite a large-scale of democratic reform was enforced by 
the Occupational Army. Activities for democratization were pursued by managers, 
for example, Keizai Doyu Kai (an association of managers) with Mr. Kazutaka 
Kikawada as a central figure. At the same time, many trade unions were newly 
formed. In miserable economic situation industrial strife often occurred. The 
experience of the strife in such an extreme situation led to perception that simple 
repetition of selfish behavior and conflicts of interests would result in ruin of 
enterprises themselves and loss of livelihood of all the working people. 
    Due to dissolution of Zaibatsu, the so-called “capitalists” have quickly 
disappeared from Japan and only managers and workers have remained as the 
persons actively concerned. In addition, most of managers from the prewar period 
were expelled due to the political purge. As a result, in many enterprises newly 
inaugurated managers were people who had taken pains close to production 
processes as middle-ranking executives until yesterday. They were fellows in the 
production processes.  
  Itami (2000) writes about activities for democratization pursued by managers. 
In his book Itami introduces an important material which he recently found among 
old documents. It is Draft Plan of Democratization of Enterprises, published in 
September 1947. He quotes an essential part form the Draft Plan, which says: “It is 
our principle that an enterprise is a cooperative society composed by management, 
capital and labor. … The absolute relationship of the shareholders to the enterprise 
shall be changed. …”. It is very impressive that such a radical statement was 
announced not by leaders of trade unions but by managers of companies. Its central 
figure was Mr. Banjo Ohtsuka (President of the Nihon Special Steel Pipe Company). 
By the way, also Kakurai (2005) mentions Mr. Banjo Ohtsuka (p.155). 
According to Itami, quite naturally, perception that an enterprise belongs to 
working people has emerged in such a situation. It is a natural discussion that sharing 
in enterprise shall be dispersed democratically. Every enterprise is together with its 
business partners in the same boat, and therefore, they cannot survive unless they 
cooperate with one another. An era has come when the principle of human-capitalist 
system can be implicitly shared (Itami, 1987, p.62). Taking this context into mind, 
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style management = Principle of human-capitalism × Environment of the postwar 
Japan (Ibid., p.64). 
 
Table 3 Strength and weakness of Human-Capitalist System  
Strengths: Weaknesses 
Sovereignty resides in employees. 
Persons worthy of sovereign are 
working people. 
Weak check of mismanagement 
Employees sovereignty is more efficient 
than shareholders sovereignty in the two 
points: 
1.  a community of interests 
2.  informational efficiency of decision-
making 
Shareholders’ meeting has been 
reduced to a shell, only a ceremony. 
It is easy for employees to accumulate 
skills and knowledge effectively.  
Internal auditing (by Internal Auditors) 
does not function well. 
Source: Prepared by the author based on Itami (1987) and Itami (2000). 
 
Human-capitalism has strengths and weaknesses as shown by Table 3. Of 
course, Japanese enterprises must overcome such weaknesses while preserving their 
strengths. These are future challenges for corporate governance in Japan 
   By the way, what will become of shareholders? On this point Itami says as 
follows: People who provide a company with money do not work in the company. 
Nor they are persons who take part in activities in the company and receive 
satisfaction from the work in any forms. Basically, they are persons who aim to get 
returns on the investment. It would be the most suitable that shareholders would not 
become almighty sovereign, but silent partner with the last voice (2000, p.148). 
 
 
IV. Iwai’s argument 
 
Iwai defines corporate governance as follows: “Corporate governance is a 
problem how to control managers’ works in order that joint-stock are efficiently 
managed”(Iwai, 2003,, p.84). Iwai’s main works on corporate governance include: 
Iwai (2003), What will become companies hereafter? ; and Iwai (2005), For whom companies 
exist?. A uniqueness of his arguments is that he attaches importance to the concept 
‘legal persons’. Naturally, his arguments begin with the concept of ‘legal person’.  
According to him, legal person has two aspects: persons and at the same time 
things. A company as a legal person can conclude a contract with other company. A 
company can sue (an) individual(s) or other company. Shareholders are not owners 
of assets of company. They own a ‘company as a thing’. A ‘company as a thing’ is 
not a thing which has a concrete form. It is, in fact, abstract things called stacks or 





In order for a company as legal person to conduct its managerial activity in 
society, it absolutely needs a living person who actually make use of funds and 
concludes contracts with others in the name of the company. A person who 
conducts management for and in place of the company is called “representative 
director” (Daihyo Torishimariyaku & Shacho). In case of foundation like a museum, 
a trustee (Riji) does that (Ibid., p.77) . 
    A representative director is an organ. A representative organ such as 
representative director or trustee is an entity which substitutes for organ like a brain, 
ears, a mouth, and hands and legs of a legal person. Thereby the organ makes a legal 
person behave in the real society as if it is a person with flesh and blood. He is like a 
puppet manipulator in Ningyo Joruri, a Japanese puppet show. An important point is 
that manager(s) is (are) absolutely necessary for a joint-stock company. Without 
manager(s), a joint stock-company can never function as a person in the real society 
(Ibid., pp.77-78). 
If a manager is not an agent of the shareholders on the basis of a contract of 
commission, what is he? He is “a person entrusted fiduciary” (simply called a 
fiduciary). Fiduciary is a quite different concept from contract. For example, it is a 
relationship between a sick person in unconsciousness and a medical doctor who 
operates the former. Relationship between persons like infants, mentally handicapped 
persons or senile persons who cannot, de jure or de facto, conclude a contract, and 
guardians who manage property on behalf of them. Jobs of experts with highly 
professional expertise such as lawyer, engineer, teacher, accountant, fund manager do 
for others are based on fiduciary, even if they conclude contracts. Because there is a 
big difference in knowledge and ability between them and their clients (Ibid., pp.81-
82). 
  An organ which represents a legal person like a manager of a company or 
trustee of a foundation is also placed in a relationship of fiduciary with these legal 
persons. Legal persons are honorable person in contracts like a sick person in 
unconsciousness who is conveyed to an emergency hospital, but they have in reality 
no ability to conclude contracts. A legal person’s representative organ which 
expresses the will and acts on behalf of the legal person is necessarily a fiduciary of 
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Table 4 Comparison between a Classic Enterprises and a Joint-stock 
Company 
Classic (Individual or joint) enterprise  Joint-stock company 
Managers do not necessarily exist. An 
owner is the manager. Even if there is a 
manager other than an owner, the 
manager is only a person who is 
entrusted to manage by the owner on the 
latter’s own responsibility. The manager is 
an agent of the owner. Their relationship 
is voluntary proxy. A contract of 
commission is concluded between the 
both  
A manager exists not because he has a 
contract with shareholders, but 
because the Company Law prescribes 
that companies should have their 
managers. 
Source: Ibid., p.79. 
 
Any contracts concluded among persons concerned in the relationship of 
fiduciary become basically a ‘self-contract’ of the fiduciary. It is a fundamental 
principle that a self-contract is invalid as a contract. Fiduciary obligation includes the 
following points: (1) A fiduciary should do his job not for his own interest, but do 
his job faithfully only for the partner of the fiduciary relationship (obligation of 
faithfulness); (2) A fiduciary is obliged to do his job with usual carefulness which is 
required in each position (obligation of carefulness). The fiduciary obligation is a 
‘compulsory regulation’, which take precedence over contracts as ‘voluntary 
regulations’ (Ibid, pp.85-88).  
    Barle and Means (1932) pointed out that the phenomenon ‘separation of 
ownership and management’ has become prevalent in modern joint-stock companies. 
Since then, a problem has raised how to regain shareholder’s sovereignty and make 
professional managers act faithfully for the shareholders’ interest. The corporate 
governance system in the USA has drastically changed in response to the tendency 
of laissez-faire which spread since the second half of 1970s and the emergence of 
the Reagan Administration (1980). In 1980s it became very popular that a stock 
option is used as a kind of remuneration to managers (executives). Stock option is 
‘right to buy stocks (shares) from the company at a predetermined price at designated 
time in future (Iwai, 2003, pp.89-90). 
  Iwai introduces a discussion in the USA. A method to regain shareholders’ 
sovereignty is to abolish the separation of ownership and management. If their 
manager becomes a shareholder, “shareholders’ sovereignty” will automatically 
revive. At least, if the remuneration of manager is connected with the price of the 
company’s shares, then his pursuit for his own interest will simply lead to the 
interests of shareholders. If a manager receives the remuneration especially in the 
form of stock option, he will wholeheartedly endeavor to increase the price of the 
company’s shares (Ibid., pp.91-92). 




neglects the fact that there is essential difference between governance of classic 
enterprises and governance of joint-stock companies and makes a theoretical error 
(Ibid., p.95). He says the reason as follows: In the case of a classic enterprise, a 
manager is an agent of the owner. The owner concludes a contract with a manager 
of his own accord. He can include whatever clause in the contract. However, in the 
case of governance of a joint-stock company, i.e., corporate governance, 
circumstances are quite different. A manager of a joint-stock company is not an 
agent of shareholders, but a representative organ of the company. Whatever contract 
a joint-stock company concludes can be concluded only through its manager. 
Consequently, any contracts concluded between a company and its manager would 
necessarily become a self-contract of the manager. If a manager is thinking only 
about pursuit for self-interest, it would be possible for him to make out whatever 
contract convenient for him. Therefore, managers’ behavior in joint-stock companies 
is  required a kind of ethics. Recently in the USA increasingly many companies pay 
their managers remuneration in the form of a bonus connected with the stock price 
or stock option. In this point self-contracts by managers are suspected
2 (Ibid., pp.95-
96).    
Its consequence is clear. A big difference in remuneration has emerged between 
a president of company and an employee. The average difference in Japan is 12 
times. In contrast, in the USA the diference increased from 85 times in 1990 to 531 
times in 2000. One of the worst case is the scandal of the Enron (Ibid., pp.92-94). 
  It is well known that there have been differences between laws and practices. 
Iwai explains the differences in the following way: According to the Corporate Law, 
for example, employees are persons outside a company. They are only persons who 
concluded contracts of employment with a company as legal person. In that sense, 
they have no difference from suppliers of raw materials, buyers of products and 
financial institution. Here is a paradox: In Japan an employee of a company is usually 
called ‘shain’, which literally means a staff member of a company. In the Corporate 
Law the word ‘shain’ denotes a shareholder, who is really an owner of the company. 
Traditional economics have been treating employees as persons outside the 
                                                            
2 Itami (2000) is also very critical about stock option for the following reasons: First, stock option as 
an incentive for a manager is a device which might lead to fraudulence. A manager gets a right to buy 
his own company’s shares at a low price. When the share price becomes higher he exercises his right 
and buys the shares at a lower price. If he sells the shares then capital gain immediately emerges, and 
he can obtain it as a cash income. The cash income is remuneration which he received directly from 
the company but he received from a man who has newly become a shareholder. In other words, stock 
option has a quite different way of thinking from profit sharing in which a company rewards its 
shareholders from earnings that it really accomplished, but stock option aims to reward a manager by 
an income transferred from an investor in a stock market. A manager who earned money is a person 
who enjoys a wide-ranging power of decision-making which affects the price of the company’s share. 
There is a too big difference in information between a new shareholder who buys the share that the 
manager sells and the manager himself. Here, in a nutshell, is a source of fraudulence which might 
lead to a variant of insider trading. Second, although stock option is given allegedly for shareholders’ 
sake, it contains danger of an excessive income of a manager (pp.341-343). Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 4  111 
companies and only suppliers of labor services. However, Japanese ‘salary man’ (a 
Japanese expression which actually denotes an ordinary employee) identifies himself 
with his company. The consciousness of representative organs of the companies 
spread at least partially to common members of the companies, who are only 
employees de jure. As the case may be, such consciousness reaches blue color 
workers. Why? Because they are persons who invest in ‘organization-specific human 
resources’. In the era of post-industrial society, investment in human assets (i.e., 
brain) becomes increasingly more important. In this way, Iwai points out the limit of 




Certainly, there are problems in the present situation of corporate governance in 
Japan. A change in corporate governance in Japan is inevitable. Corporate 
governance must be more transparent. However, it will not be the American type of 
corporate governance that companies in Japan should aim at. 
  Problems that the American type of corporate governance involves were 
clarified from discussions of two representative Professors in Japan. Using his 
unique expression ‘Human-capitalism’, Itami argues positive aspects of the Japanese 
enterprise system. After explaining his formula that an institution is a product of a 
principle and an environment, he argues that the Japanese type management has 
emerged in a special situation in which Japan was placed immediately after the war. It 
is evident from his formula that with a change in the environment accordingly the 
institution should change. According to him, even if a concrete institution changes 
‘human-capitalism’ as a principle remains unchanged. He criticizes an opinion which 
has been prevalent in the USA that shareholders should be the almighty. I think that 
his criticism deserves attention. However, it would be better for us to take ‘human-
capitalism’ as a kind of ideal type. In reality, there are many companies whose 
behavior contradicts the principle of ‘human-capitalism’. If all the companies in 
Japan behave like ‘human-capitalist enterprise’, phenomena such as ‘karosh’ (death 
from overwork) should have never occurred. 
  Iwai argues what joint-stock companies ought to be on the basis of a concept 
‘legal person’. According to Iwai, a representative director is an organ of a joint-stock 
company, and he/she is a fiduciary of the joint-stock company. From his standpoint, 
a popular way that managers receive their remuneration in the form of a bonus 
connected with the stock price or stock option in the USA means a self-contract, i.e., 
a kind of prohibited technique.  
He criticizes the American type of corporate governance in which shareholders 
are the almighty on the ground that investment in human capital will become 
increasingly more important in post-industrial society. Although different in their 
approaches, his argument in this point has something in common with Itami’s 
following argument: The original source of enterprises’ competitiveness is the 




derives from invisible assets which the enterprises have accumulated such as 
technology, know-how, trustworthiness, etc. Such invisible assets cannot be bought 
with money. Enterprises need to accumulate in these assets by themselves. It takes 
time to produce them. Once accumulated, however, they can be used in multiple 
ways. These assets have such specific features (Itami, 2000, p.96). I think that 
investment in human capital or invisible assets is one of key issues when we consider 
corporate governance.  
  Japanese type of corporate governance will gradually change in the future, but 





Abegglen, James C (2004), Shin Nihon no Keiei [21
st Century Japanese Management], 
Tokyo: Nihonkeizai Shimbunsha.(in J) 
Berle, A. A. and G. C. Means (1932), Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
Macmillan; Its Japanese version translated by Tadao Kitajima, published by Bungado 
Ginkohkenkyusha in 1958.  
Dore, Ronald (2001), Nihongata Shihonshugi to Shijoshugi no Shototsu: Nichi-Doku tai 
Anguro-Sakuson [Encounter of  Japanese Type Capitalism with Marketism: Japan-Germany vs. 
Anglo-Saxon;  The Japanese Version of his book Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare 
Capitalism], Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimposha. 
Itami, Hiroyuki (1987), Jinponshugi Kigyo [Human-capitalism], Tokyo: Chikuma 
Shobo. 
____________ (1990), Porando karano Tegami: 1989 [Letters from Poland: 1989], 
Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo. 
____________ (2000), Nihongata Koporeto Gabanansu: Jugyoin Shuken Kigyo no Ronri 
to Kaikaku [Japanese Corporate Governance: Logic and Reforms of  Enterprises with Employees 
Sovereignty], Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha. (in J) 
Itami, Hiroyuki and Yujiro Itami (2002), Ushinawarenakatta 10 Nen [A Decade 
Unlost], Tokyo: NTT Shuppan. (in J) 
Iwai, Katsuhito (1999), Persons, Things, and Corporations: The Corporate 
Personality Controversy and Comparative Governance, The American Journal of  
Comparative Law, Vol.47, No.4, Fall 1999.  
____________ (2003), Kaisha ha Korekara Dohnarunoka? [What Will Become 
Companies Hereafter?], Tokyo: Heibonsha. (in J)  
____________ (2005), Kaisha ha Dare no Mono ka? [To Whom Companies Belong?] 
                                                            
3 Nobuo Takahashi, Professor at the University of Tokyo, a specialist of managerial organization 
stresses the importance of Japanese style of seniority system and severely criticizes ‘Seikashugi’ (system 
which differentiates employees according to their results). He argues as follows: People will not work 
hard by ‘Seikashugi’. Make a job itself worthwhile. Japanese style of seniority system is, in essence, not 
a system which rewards by salary but a system which rewards by the content of next job. Try to build 
environment of Japanese style seniority system where the young are engrossed in their works without 
anxiety of daily lives. Takahashi (2004a) and Takahashi (200b). Romanian Economic and Business Review – Vol. 5, No. 4  113 
Tokyo: Heibonsha. (in J) 
Kakurai, Yasuo (2005), Kigyo toha Nanika? [What are Enterprises?], Tokyo: 
Gakushunotomosha. (in J) 
Okumura, Hiroshi (1984), Hohjin Shihonshugi: “Kaish Hon’i no Taikei” [Corporate 
Capitalism: System of  ‘Company Stardard’], Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo. (in J) 
Takahashi, Nobuo (2004a), Kyomo no Seikashugi: Nihongata Nenkohsei Fkkatsu no 
Susume [False System based on Results: Recommendation of  Revival of  Japanese Type of  Seniority 
System], Tokyo: Nikkei BP Sha. (in J) 
_______________ (2004b), Nihongata Nenkohsei wo Ikase, Nikkei Shimbun, 
June 9, 2004.(in J) 
Uemura, Tatsuo (2007), Opinion on for a provisional injunction against the 
resolution of Bulldog Sauce Company’s shareholders’ meeting. (in J) 
http://www.21coe-win-cls.org/070626uemuraikensho_bulldog.pdf (accessed on 
March 20, 2009)  
Yamada, Shin’ya (2005), Tsumamigui Shin Kaishahoh [Concise Commentary of  the New 
Company Law], Tokyo: Seishun Shuppann. (in J)  
Yamada, Tsuyoshi (2004), Japanese Corporate Governance under the Revision 
of Corporation Law, and Financial Law Reform in Japan, Hosei Riron, Law and 
Political Science Association Niigata University, Vol.37, No.1. 
Wakasugi, Takaaki (1999), Professor Wakasugi’s Papers related to Corporate 
Governance (in J), http://home.att.ne.jp/green/mlc/tw/cg99.html (accessed on 
March 27, 2007) 